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COMMENTS
THE STATUS OF DEDICATED LAND IN ILLINOIS
Increased urban population in northern Illinois, coupled with public
demand, gave rise to a search by the University of Illinois trustees for a
permanent site for a Chicago campus for the University of Illinois. Many
sites were considered, including Garfield Park, on the west side of Chi-
cago, the Harrison-Halsted area, and Meigs Field. The Enabling Act of
1959 was passed to allow the University to obtain Chicago Park District
land and to remove any restrictions thereon by condemnation proceed-
ings.1
Shortly thereafter, the University trustees obtained an option to pur-
chase a section of Garfield Park which was dedicated to the city in 1882.
The proposed sale was immediately contested by the State of Illinois,
which challenged the constitutionality of the special act. It was also con-
tested by residents near the park, who wished to protect their easements
of view, light, and air. Property owners around the downtown area in-
tervened because they realized that if Garfield Park could be taken, so
could Grant Park, which is dedicated land along the lakefront in down-
town Chicago.
The trial court, relying mainly on the Grant Park Cases2 (four cases,
decided between 1897 and 1911, which held that dedicated land in Illinois
could neither be diverted nor condemned), held that (1) Garfield Park
was dedicated land, (2) the special act was unconstitutional, and (3) an
injunction should be issued to restrain any sale or condemnation pro-
ceedings.
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Illinois, the transfer was allowed,
and South Park Comm'rs v. Montgomery Ward & Co. 8-last of the four
Grant Park Cases, which held that dedicated land could not be taken by
eminent domain-was specifically overruled.
A petition for rehearing was filed. Under Illinois law no judgment be-
comes final until the petition for rehearing has been ruled upon or the
time for filing a petition has elapsed. 4 But before the petition could be
heard by the court, the University trustees reversed themselves and chose
1 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 144, §§ 70.1-.4 (1959).
2 Chicago v. Ward, 169 111. 392, 48 N.E. 927 (1897); Bliss v. Ward, 198 I1. 104, 64
N.E. 705 (1902); Ward v. Field Museum, 241 I1. 496, 89 NE. 731 (1909); South Park
Comm'rs v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 248 Ill. 299, 93 N.E. 910 (1911).
3 Supra note 2.
4 ILL. Sm Cr. R. 44,45, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 101.44-.45 (1959).
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the Harrison-Halsted area. They apparently were no longer interested in
Garfield Park. Counsel for the residents, since the controversy had now
become moot, moved that the Supreme Court remand to the trial court
with directions to dismiss their (the residents') original cause of action.
No objection was made by the Chicago Park District, and the motion was
granted. The "opinion" of the Illinois Supreme Court was withdrawn; it
will not be published and it will not be considered precedent.
The necessity for public construction will, in all likelihood, give rise
to another instance in which dedicated land, if not Garfield Park itself,
will once again be sought. Therefore, it would seem that a discussion of
the status of dedicated lands is most apropos.
Illinois finds itself in a unique position. On one side of the coin, there
are the Grant Park Cases, which held that dedicated land could neither
be condemned nor diverted for other uses; on the other side is a with-
drawn opinion overruling these cases. If dedicated land in the future is
threatened by eminent domain, the question that will arise is what courses
of action will be taken. In order to arrive at a probable answer to the
above question, this article will cover the nature of dedicated land, the
use of eminent domain, and the development of these concepts in Illinois.
THE NATURE AND USE OF DEDICATED PROPERTY
The appropriation or gift by the owner of land, or some interest or
easement therein, to public use, and acceptance thereof, either express or
implied, has been held by the Illinois courts to be a dedication.5 It is
peculiar in three major respects, insofar as it operates to convey a right
to real property: (1) There need be no writing;6 (2) there need be no
grantee in esse;7 (3) the owner need not part with his title.8 Furthermore,
an owner of land may, by reason of his acts or conduct, be estopped from
denying a dedication to the use of the public.9 There have been times
5 Kennedy v. Town of Normal, 359 Il. 306, 194 N.E. 576 (1934); Du Pont v. Miller,
310 Ill. 140, 141 N.E. 423 (1923).
6 Marlowe v. Rich, 252 111. 442, 96 N.E. 921 (1911). Furthermore, a dedication may be
made in every conceivable way by which the intention of the party, whether by
words or acts, can be manifested. Kennedy v. Town of Normal, supra note 5; Wiehe
v. Pein, 281 IIl. 130, 117 N.E. 849 (1917); Trammell v. Bradford, 198 Ala. 513, 73 So.
894 (1917); People v. Chicago & N. W. Ry., 239 Ill. 42, 87 N.E. 946 (1909); Davidson
v. Reed, 111 Ill. 167 (1884).
7 Village of Riverside v. Maclean, 210 Ill. 308, 71 N.E. 408 (1904). This is so since the
public is an ever-existing grantee, capable of taking a dedication for public use, and
its interests are a sufficient consideration to support them. Nelson v. Randolph, 222 Ill.
531, 78 N.E. 914 (1906); Warren v. President & Trustees, 15 111. 236 (1853).
8 City of Burlingame v. Norberg, 210 Cal. 105, 290 Pac. 587 (1930); Nelson v. Ran-
dolph, supra note 7.
9 People ex rel. Markgraff v. Rosenfield, 383 Ill. 468, 50 N.E.2d 479 (1943); Hooper
v. Haas, 332 111. 561, 164 N.E. 23 (1928); Village of Benld v. Dorsey, 311 IMl. 192, 142
N.E. 563 (1924).
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when a landowner has been held to have dedicated his land to the public
use by reason of his acquiescence in the use of such land by the public,
when it was shown that he had knowledge of such use.10
If one were classifying dedications, the classifications would fall into
two major categories: express" and implied 12 (wherein intent is gathered
from the acts of the dedicator) dedications on one hand, and common-law
and statutory dedications on the other. In Illinois, a statutory dedication is
one that must be made strictly pursuant to the statute.18 This statute pro-
vides that the acknowledgement and recordation or filing of a plat shall
be held to be a conveyance in fee simple of such portions as are noted
and dedicated to the public. If, however, there is a defective statutory
dedication, as, for example, if the plat is not acknowledged 14 or is im-
properly acknowledged, 15 the dedication may nevertheless operate as a
common-law dedication when all the necessary elements are present.'"
A common-law dedication may be created orally or by plat'7 or deed,18
and conforms to the definition and discussion in the beginning of this
section.
It thus appears that anything which would be a dedication at common
law is still a dedication today, even when the attempt to have a statutory
dedication fails. However, it should be noted that in Illinois, in statutory
dedications there is a conveyance in fee simple determinable subject to
being defeated' when the land is no longer used for the purpose for
which it was dedicated; whereas in common-law dedications a fee does
not pass20-the body politic is said to hold the property in trust for the
public.21 Illinois also has conditional dedications.22 As the words imply,
10 Town of Bethel v. Pruett, 215 111. 162, 74 N.E. 111 (1905).
"t Richeson v. Richeson, 8 111. App. 204 (1881); Palmer v. City of Clinton, 52 111. App.
67 (1893).
12 City of Athens v. Burkett, 59 S. W. 404 (Tenn. Ch. 1900). This type of dedication
is founded on the doctrine of equitable estoppel. Cincinnati v. Lessee of White, 31
U.S. [6 Pet.] 431 (1832). Contra Note, 16 HARV. L. REV. 128 (1902).
13 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 109, § 3 (1959).
14 Owen v. Village of Brookport, 208 M11. 35, 69 N.E. 952 (1904).
15 Earll v. City of Chicago, 136 111. 277, 26 N.E. 370 (1891).
16 Farwell v. City of Chicago, 247111.235,93 N.E. 168 (1910).
17 Ward v. Field Museum, 241 Il. 496, 89 N.E. 731 (1909).
18 Richeson v. Richeson, 8 Ill. App. 204 (1881).
19 St. Clair County Housing Authority v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 387 Il. 180,
56 N.E.2d 357 (1944).
20 Kennedy v. Town of Normal, 359 11. 306, 194 N.E. 576 (1934); Clokey v. Wabash
Ry., 353 Ill 349, 187 N.E. 475 (1933).
21 Hooper v. Haas, 332 Ml. 561, 164 N.E. 23 (1928).
22 Village of Lake Bluff v. Dalitsch, 415 M. 476, 114 N.E.2d 654 (1953).
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these are dedications upon which the dedicator has put restrictions with
which there must be compliance, i.e., providing that the restrictions are
both consistent with, and will not interfere with, the grant.
Needless to say, the scope of the doctrine of dedication has been greatly
expanded since its inception. 23 The courts have held that land may be
dedicated for use by the public as a park, common, or public square;2 4
as a wharf or landing place;25 as a cemetery;2 6 for school purposes; 27 for
a street, alley, or highway;28 for the erection of public buildings;2 9 and
for pleasure grounds or for the erection of public works.30 One Illinois
court has even gone so far as to state that an artificially constructed
waterway may be dedicated.31 But the Illinois courts have held that land
may not be dedicated for either a railway 32 or for any private purpose.33
A SUMMARY OF THE PROBLEMS WITH RESPECT TO DEDICATED LANDS
One of the most important problems involving dedicated lands is
whether or not they may be diverted to other purposes. For example,
this problem may appear where land has been dedicated for a park in an
area that has become the heart of the business district of a town, so that
the town leaders are desirous of putting the dedicated land to a more
practical use. Specifically, there are two types of dedications: (1) Where
property is dedicated for a specific purpose, e.g., "for park purposes
only," and (2) where property is unrestrictively dedicated, e.g., "for use
by the public." Where property has been dedicated for a specific purpose,
the general rule is that neither the legislature, a municipality, nor the
general public has the power to use the property for any purpose other
than the one designated. 4 This is so whether the use be public or pri-
23 Baker v. Johnston, 21 Mich. 319 (1870). For a discussion of the early common-
law theory of dedication see Id. at 340-41.
24 Carstens v. City of Wood River, 332 111.400, 163 N.E. 816 (1928).
25 City of Alton v. Illinois Transp. Co., 12 Ill. 38 (1850).
26 Wormley v. Wormley, 207 I1. 411, 69 N.E. 865 (1904).
27 Board of Regents v. Painter, 102 Mo. 464, 14 S.W. 938 (1890).
28 City of Princeton v. Gustavson, 241 Il. 566, 89 N.E. 653 (1909).
29 Spires v. City of Los Angeles, 150 Cal. 64, 87 Pac. 1026 (1906).
30 City of Morrison v. Hinkson, 87 Ill. 587 (1877).
81 Du Pont v. Miller, 310 l. 140,141 N.E. 423 (1923).
32 Lake Erie & W. R.R. v. Whitham, 155 111. 514, 40 N.E. 1014 (1895).
33 People ex rel. Scott v. Ricketts, 248 111. 428, 94 N.E. 71 (1911).
34 Michigan Blvd. Bldg. Co. v. Chicago Park Dist., 412 Ill. 350, 106 N.E.2d 359 (1952);
City of Chicago v. Ward, 169 I. 392, 48 N.E. 927 (1897); Village of Princeville v.
Auten, 77 111. 325 (1875).
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vate,35 and this rule is not affected by the fact that the changed use may
be advantageous to the public.8 0 A dedication to a general public use, on
the other hand, is not so strictly construed that a change may not be
made by the legislature or municipality. A recent Illinois case on this
point is Schien v. City of Virden.3 7 In that case, land was dedicated by
plat to the City of Virden by private citizens. The parcel of land dedi-
cated was labeled as "public ground." The court followed an earlier de-
cision,38 which held such a designation to be an unrestricted dedication
to public use. The city was allowed to erect a firehouse on this land for
the benefit of all the citizens in the fire district, since this would be in
furtherance, rather than in restriction, of public use. By way of dictum
the court stated that any attempt to alienate would be restrained. But
in Babin v. City of Ashland,39 the Ohio Supreme Court held that by con-
struing "public ground" to mean ground belonging to the public, rather
than ground to be used by the public, the City of Ashland was able to
convey the fee to dedicated lands.
But the courts are not confined to changing the uses of dedicated land
solely on the ground that it is generally rather than restrictively dedicated.
The cy pres doctrine was employed to change the use of dedicated land
in City of Aurora ex rel. Egan v. Y.M.C.A. 40 There, land was dedicated
to the city for "public purposes." Originally designed to be used as a
park, it had neither been substantially used as such nor improved since
1945. Part of the parcel was being used as a parking lot for workers in
nearby factories that had been built after the dedication was made; fur-
thermore, city planners determined that the land was inappropriate for
public use. In remanding the case with instructions to apply cy pres, the
court stated:
Under the doctrine of cy pres, if property is given in trust to be applied to a
particular charitable purpose, and it becomes impossible, impractical or illegal
to carry out the particular purpose, . . . the trust will not fail but the court
will direct the application of the property to some charitable purpose falling
within the general purpose of the settlor.4 1
35 City of Fort Worth v. Burnett, 131 Tex. 190, 114 S.W.2d 220 (1938); Grady v. City
of Greenville, 129 S.C. 89, 123 S.E. 494 (1924).
36 Baldwin Manor v. City of Birmingham, 341 Mich. 423, 67 N.W.2d 812 (1954).
37 5 Ill.2d 494, 126 N.E.2d 201 (1955).
38 Chicago, R. I. & P.R.R. v. City of Joliet, 79 111. 25 (1875).
39 160 Ohio St. 328, 116 N.E.2d 580 (1953).
40 9 Ill.2d 286, 137 N.E.2d 347 (1956).
41 Id. at 294, 137 N.E.2d at 353.
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The court volunteered that a similar trust should be imposed upon the
proceeds of the sale. 42
In Kingsville Independent School Dist. v. Crenshaw,43 the court arrived
at a conclusion similar to that in the Egan case without recourse to the
cy pres doctrine. A dedication by deed provided that the land should be
used as a public park for the pleasure of the City of Kingsville and that
no building should be built thereon. As in City of Aurora ex rel. Egan v.
Y.M.C.A., 44 the public did not use the land as a park; it was chiefly used
as a place of crossing for pedestrians passing in that direction. The court
determined that the property was needed for school construction pur-
poses, that it was neither practicable nor possible to use any other prop-
erty for the erection of a school, and that the land would serve the needs
of the public better if the "park" were abandoned and a school built.
Under such circumstances, the court decided that the land could be
alienated or condemned. 45
No problem as to diversion arises where the city owns the absolute fee.
In Brooklyn Park Comm'rs v. Armstrong,48 the City of Brooklyn con-
demned certain land, acquired the fee, and dedicated the land to use as a
public park. Later, the City decided to sell some of the land rather than
retain it as a park. The court held that although the City could not of
itself alienate the land in contravention of the public right, since it had
obtained legislative authority, it had the power to so alienate. And in
Clarke v. City of Providence,47 -where the complainant sought to enjoin
the city from filling in a cove basin and from diverting the surrounding
land-dedicated as a public park-to other uses, since the fee was in the
City and the proper legislative authority given, the court also held that
the City could discontinue the use of such lands and sell it.4
s
Thus it can be seen that recourse to eminent domain is unnecessary
where the fee is in the municipality. 49 The question of eminent domain
42 Other examples of cy pres: Trustees of New Castle Common v. Gordy, 33 Del.
Ch. 334, 93 A.2d 509 (1952). Board of Educ. v. City of Rockford, 372 111. 442, 24 N.E.2d
366 (1939).
43 164 S.W.2d 49 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942).
44 9 Il.2d 286, 137 N.E.2d 347 (1956).
45 The statute under which the court would have allowed eminent domain was ex-
ceptionally broad. It in no way mentioned the type of land to be condemned.
4645 N.Y. 234 (1871).
47 16 R. 1. 337, 15 Atl. 763 (1888).
48 See Ferry v. City of Seattle, 116 Wash. 648, 200 Pac. 336 (1921); State v. Dexter,
10 R. I. 341 (1872).
49 Compare City of Jacksonville v. Jacksonville Ry., 67 Ill. 540 (1873); Warren v.
Mayor of Lyons City, 22 Ia. 351 (1867); Le Clercq v. Town of Gallipolis, 7 Ohio 218
(1835), where the fee was not in the city.
COMMENTS
arises when the fee is in individual proprietors, or if it is in the cities or
towns, is in them as trustees under a special trust for the public.
EMINENT DOMAIN
"Eminent domain" is a phrase used to designate the power of a sover-
eign state (or to those to whom the power is delegated) to take property
within the sovereign's- jurisdiction for public use without the owner's
consent, if just compensation is made.50 This right is an attribute of sov-
ereignty and whatsoever exists in any form, tangible or intangible, may
be seized and appropriated to public use when necessity demands it.51 No
matter how broad these judicial definitions may be, there are areas which
are impregnable to the thrust of eminent domain. It has been held that
when federally-owned property is devoted to aiding the federal govern-
ment in fulfilling the high trusts imposed upon it in carrying out the pur-
poses of its existence, such property is protected from eminent domain. 52
It has also been held that eminent domain is impotent to reach money and
promissory notes,53 or the privilege of fishing in private waters. 54 Fur-
ther, the courts have decided that the taking of property through eminent
domain so as to allow B to take land from A and devote it to the
same recognized public use to which A had devoted it will not be
tolerated.55 This obviously would amount to nothing more than a com-
pulsory change of hands;56 therefore, property in public use cannot be
taken to be used in the same manner and for the same purpose.57
It has frequently been held that neither contracts themselves58 nor the
50 Dept. of Public Works & Bldgs. v. Kirkendall, 415 Ill. 214, 112 N.E.2d 611,(1953);
Litchfield & M. Ry. v. Alton & S.R.R., 305 Ill. 388, 137 N.E. 248 (1922); Eddleman v.
Union County Traction & Power Co., 217 111. 409, 75 N.E. 510 (1905).
51 Metropolitan Co. Ry. v. Chicago W. D. Ry., 87 IMI. 317 (1877).
52 Fort Leavenworth R.R. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525 (1885); United States v. City of
Chicago, 48 U.S. 185 (1849). This is not to say that all governmental lands were always
immune. At one time, the courts made a distinction between lands held in a govern-
mental capacity and those held in a proprietary one. The latter was subject to eminent
domain by the states. State v. Superior Court for Jefferson County, 91 Wash. 454,
157 Pac. 1097 (1916). A later case held that a trust covers future uses when, and as
they arise; thus making all federal lands immune, Utah Power & Light Co. v. United
States, 243 U.S. 389 (1917).
53 Cary Library v. Bliss, 151 Mass. 364,25 N.E. 92 (1890).
54 Albright v. Sussex County Lake & Park Comm'n, 71 N. J. L. 303, 57 Ad. 398 (1904).
55 Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. v. Chicago & W. I. R.R., 97 111. 506 (1881).
56 Suburban R.R. v. Metropolitan West Side Elevated R.R., 193 Ill. 217, 61 N.E. 1090
(1901).
57 Chicago & N. W. Ry. v. Chicago & E.R.R., 112 Ill. 589 (1884).
58 Long Island Water Supply Co., v. Brooklyn, 166 U.S. 685 (1897); Cornwall v.
Louisville & N.R.R., 87 Ky. 72,7 S.W. 553 (1888).
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"contract clause" of the Constitution can bar the eminent domain power
from reaching the property coveted for the power's legitimate ends.5 9
However, some courts have recognized that unusual factual situations
make the use of eminent domain untenable. To allow its use in such cases
would unconscionably frustrate the fulfillment of the double trust 0 im-
posed by the terms of the dedication.61 For example, in Hall v. Fairchild-
Gilmore-Wilton Co.,62 the City of San Diego, with legislative authority,
attempted to lay a highway across a dedicated public park. The highway
would, when completed, have taken up about sixty per cent of the public
park. The court, in holding such taking illegal, stated that "the city
council ... was utterly without jurisdiction to take over . . . a public
park, and make of it a highway .... ,,63 The court added that "when
land is once dedicated for park purposes it is beyond the authority of a
city, or even the Legislature, to withdraw it therefrom."6' 4
At times, where property was held for public purposes by a municipal
corporation, it was held that the land could not be condemned by third
persons (a private person or a corporation) where the public use would
be interfered with and curtailed.65 The limitation, however, which pro-
hibits a municipality from using dedicated land for another and incon-
sistent purpose does not apply against the United States, since the su-
premacy of a federal public use over all other uses must be recognized
under the federal constitution.6 6
DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY
Eminent domain, as was above stated, is an inherent right of the gov-
ernment which may be delegated by legislative authority.6 7 The federal
59 State ex rel. Peabody v. Superior Court, 77 Wash. 593, 138 Pac. 277 (1914); Cin-
cinnati v. Louisville & N.R.R., 223 U.S. 390 (1912); Village of Hyde Park v. Oak Woods
Cemetery Ass'n, 119 Ill. 141, 7 N.E. 627 (1886).
60 A double trust may be defined as (1) a trust in behalf of the dedicator, and (2)
a trust in behalf of the portion of those for whose benefit the dedication is made.
61 These are not cases where the dedication has been made without restriction, nor
is it similar to Cincinnati v. Louisville & N. Ry., 223 U.S. 390 (1912). In the latter case,
eminent domain was allowed to reach the dedicated property where the result was not
to deprive the public of a substantial continuation of the same or similar benefits.
62 66 Cal. App. 615, 227 Pac. 649 (1924).
63 Id. at 617,227 Pac. at 651.
64 Ibid.
65 City of Allegan v. Vonasek, 261 Mich. 16, 245 N.W. 557 (1932); State ex rel.
Schade Brewing Co. v. Superior Court, 62 Wash. 96, 113 Pac. 576 (1911).
06 United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230 (1946).
67 United States v. Certain Lands, 78 F.2d 684 (6th Cir. 1935); Adirondack Ry. v.
New York, 176 U.S. 335 (1900); Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1875).
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constitution does not confer this right, but it does limit its exercise.68
Once authority is given, the courts cannot extend or limit the power,
since this would involve the courts in a political or legislative question. 9
Decisions which involve the determination of whether an eminent
domain action shall be used, 70 the time when the eminent domain action
shall be brought,71 the wisdom or feasibility of the proposed use of the
property, 72 the amount of property to be taken,73 the nature of the
estate,74 and the choice of land to be taken,75 are all legislative functions.
In general, as a summation of the foregoing, it may be said that the legis-
lature determines the necessity of the eminent domain action.
When the power of eminent domain has been delegated to an admin-
istrative agency, the determination of necessity is then within the power
of this agency, subject, however, to the controls found in the appropriate
statutes conferring the authority upon them.70 If the agency, in exercising
its authority, exceeds the scope of the statute, the courts have the right
to decide and interpret whether the act of condemnation was authorized
by the statute."
The determination of necessity by the legislature or administrative
agency is conclusive upon the courts except in cases of gross error show-
ing prejudice or corruption.78 It should be noted that in certain circum-
stances, involving the determination of complex factual issues by experts
specially trained in their fields, the courts are reluctant to substitute their
judgment for those of the experts.79 Although it is common that the high
official making the determination as to necessity is not an expert himself,
those advising him are skilled in their respective fields.80
68 Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U.S. 282 (1893).
60Bragg v. Weaver, 251 U.S. 57 (1919); North Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman, 268
U.S. 276 (1925).
70 Chicago & N. W. Ry. v. City of Morrison, 195 Ill. 271,63 N.E. 96 (1902).
71 United States v. 23.263 Acres of Land, 45 F. Supp. 163 (W. D. Wash. 1942).
72 Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508 (1941); United
States v. 385 Acres of Land, 61 F. Supp. 746 (E.D. Wis. 1945).
73 Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U.S. 282 (1893); United States v. Gettysburg E.
Ry., 160 U.S. 668 (1896).
74 United States v. South Dakota, 212 F.2d 14 (8th Cir. 1954).
75 Atlantic C. L. R.R. v. Town of Sebring, 12 F.2d 679 (5th Cir. 1926).
76 North Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman, 268 U.S. 276 (1925); Rindge Co. v. County
of Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700 (1923).
77 Georgia v. City of Chattanooga, 264 U.S. 472 (1924).
78 Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U.S. 282 (1893).
79 See Trans-Pacific Airlines, Ltd. v. Hawaiian Airlines, Ltd., 174 F.2d 63 (9th Cir.
1949); Bristol-Meyers Co. v. FTC, 185 F.2d 58 (4th Cir. 1950).
80 United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 30 F. Supp. 372 (D. Md. 1939).
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The burden of proof is on the "condemnee" to show that the determi-
nation of necessity contained prejudice, corruption or bad faith. 8' This
burden on the "condemnee" prevents the condemnation proceedings
from becoming merely a review by the courts of the issue of necessity.
The, Illinois Supreme Court, in Pittsburgh, F. W. & C. Ry. v. Sanitary
Dist.82 gave a concise summary of the extent of judicial review by
stating:
[T]he court . . . may rightfully determine whether the petitioner has the
power to exercise the right of eminent domain; whether the property is sub-
ject to the right of eminent domain and is being taken for a public use,
whether the power is being abused by the taking of an excessive amount of
property, and other kindred questions which do not involve a determination
of the necessity or the expediency of the taking .... 83
The distinction between judicial and legislative functions in eminent
domain proceedings becomes more complicated with respect to dedicated
property. Although the courts have recognized that eminent domain is
an inherent power of the sovereign, they have imposed definite restric-
tions upon the legislative power by the exercise of their power of judicial
review.
• Where the use of eminent domain would fristrate the fulfillment of
the trust,84 it has been held that the granting of the power by the legisla-
ture, in general terms, cannot be construed to empower an appropriation
of dedicated property unless the power can be inferred from the legisla-
tive enactment.85 In City of Moline v. Greene,88 the City was held to be
without authority to condemn, for the pdr'pose of widening the street,
ten feet of land which was part of property devoted to use as a public
library. The court said: "[S]uch property cannot be taken and appro-
priated to another and different use, unless the legislative intent to so take
it has been manifested .in express terms or by necessary implication. 87
Thus it can be seen that one of the methods used by 'the courts to limit
.the legislative power in cases where dedicated property is being threatened
by eminent domain, is to state that the statute under which the power is
sought to be exercised is too general or too broad.
Where there was express legislative authority to acquire "'any real
81 Ibid.
82218111.286,75 N.E. 892 (1905).
88 Id. at 290, 75 N.E. at 894.
84 But see City of Norton v. Lowden, 84 F.2d 663 (10th Cir. 1936), where the court
granted the power since the trust would not be frustrated.
85
.Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R.,. 195 U.S. 540 (1904).
86 252 111.475,96 N.E. 911 (1911).
87 Id. at 477, 96 N.E. at'912.
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estate required for the purpose of the incorporation,' ,88. or to proceed
against land when "the title is vested in any trustee, not authorized to
sell,"" 9 the courts have held that such language is not strong enough to
warrant the use of eminent domain to appropriate property dedicated
to the public use, when it would result in a violation of the obligation
of the trust.90 In a Vermont decision,91 it was held that authority to
acquire "within or without its corporate limits, lands, springs, streams
and water rights" 92 was too general to allow condemnation for public
use of land already dedicated to another public use.
In re Southwestern State Normal School 8 involved a statute authorizing
condemnation of real estate needed for the use of state schools. The court
held that property already devoted to public use, though subject to emi-
ent domain, could not be taken without legislative authority expressly
conferred or arising by necessary implication. The court further held
that there could be no implication unless it arose from a necessity so
absolute that the grant of eminent domain to the condemnor by the
legislature would be defeated.
The courts, through judicial interpretation, have raised what may be
considered the "rule against impairment." The courts themselves have
raised the presumption that eminent domain is never granted with the in-
tention of interfering with any prior public use. Sometimes, however,
where the interference is slight and the benefit great, condemnation tak-
ing has been allowed. 94 It is exceedingly difficult to predict when the
courts will allow eminent domain under a statute, since they may de-
termine that it is specific enough, or they may say that it is too broad.
The needs of the condemnor, in relation to public demands, is on one
side; the needs of the "condemnee" in relation to the same demands is on
the other. The courts, in balancing the importance of the contesting uses
in cases involving the exercise of what they have determined to be a
general power of eminent domain, have held that the public square of a
village could not be taken for a school house;95 that land for a public
library could not be taken for widening a street;96 that park land could
88 In the matter of the Petition of the Boston & A.R.R. 53 N.Y. 574, 578 (1873).
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid.
91 Vermont Hydro-Elec. Corp. v. Dunn, 95 Vt. 144, 112 Ad. 223 (1921).
92 112 Atl. at 225.
93 213 Pa. 244, 62 Ad. 908 (1906).
94 Michigan Blvd. Bldg. Co. v. Chicago Park Dist., 412 Ill. 350, 106 N.E.2d 359
(1952); Codman v. Crocker, 203 Mass. 146, 89 N.E. 177 (1909).
95 Davis v. Nichols, 39 IM. App. 610 (1891).
96 City of Moline v. Greene, 252 111. 475,96 N.E. 911 (1911).
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not be taken by an electric power-carrying line; 97 that streets and alleys
could not be taken for a college campus;98 that land could not be taken
for a street;99 and that even the federal government, when acting solely
under the power given to it by a state, was prevented from condemning
and taking land for government forestry purposes.100 In each of these
cases, the eminent domain power could not be used to take property
although the property was desired and needed for a recognized public
use or purpose.
Many of the courts, while rejecting the concept that authority is con-
ferred by a general statute, go on to say in dicta that a special act of the
legislature which specifically names the property to be taken would be
effective to grant authority.101 An example of this is found in Louisville
& N.Ry. v. Cincinnati,10 2 where the court ruled that a statute authorizing
the railroad company to take land for a right-of-way through the city
was too general and did not apply to a public commons which was dedi-
cated for public use. The court then went on to say that their decision
did not prevent the property from ever being taken, but that special
legislation would be necessary for any appropriation in derogation of the
trust established by the dedication. Yet even after the legislature has gone
to great lengths to draw up a statute that will satisfy the courts, such a
statute may be either attacked as unconstitutional, 03 or as in South Park
Comm'rs v. Montgomery Ward & Co.,'10 4 the court may hold that the
legislature is without power to authorize the invasion of the obligations
of the trust.
THREE BACKGROUND CASES
The background which led up to the South Park case'05 can be found
in three prior decisions. The first of these decisions was Warren v. Mayor
of Lyons City.106 In that case land was dedicated for a public square. The
97 Minnesota Power & Light Co. v. State, 177 Minn. 343, 225 N.W. 164 (1929).
98 In re Southwestern State Normal School, 213 Pa. 244, 62 Atl. 908 (1906).
99 City of Edwardsville v. Madison County, 251 Ill. 265,96 N.E. 238 (1911).
100 In re Certain Lands, 119 Fed. 453 (D. Mass. 1902).
101 McCormac v. Evans, 107 S.C. 39,92 S.E. 19 (1917).
102 Louisville & N.R.R. v. City of Cincinnati, 76 Ohio St. 481, 81 N.E. 983 (1907).
103 People v. Chicago Park Dist., Nos. 36171 & 36172, Sup. Ct. Ill., Jan. 17, 1961.
104 248 Ill. 299, 93 N.E. 910 (1911). See Hall v. Fairchild-Gilmore-Wilton Co., 66
Cal. App. 615, 227 Pac. 649 (1924); Cary Library v. Bliss, 151 Mass. 364, 25 N.E. 92
(1890); City of Jacksonville v. Jacksonville Ry., 67 Ill. 540 (1873).
105 South Park Comm'rs v. Montgomery Ward & Co., supra note 104.
106 22 Iowa 351 (1867).
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defendants, proceeding under an act of the Legislature, wished to sub-
divide the public square and lease it to private individuals. The court
held that the Legislature could not authorize the violation of the contract
entered into between the plaintiff and the public, and that the statute
which authorized this diversion was void.
In City of St. Paul v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 10 7 land was dedicated
to public use as a levee. The Legislature passed a statute authorizing a
railway to use the land as a permanent site for its general freight ware-
house. The court held that the Legislature itself had no power to destroy
the trust or to divert land to another purpose, either public or private,
which was inconsistent with the particular use for which it was granted,
and that if the Legislature purported to do so, such an act would be a
nullity. In addition, the court went on to say that the Legislature's power
of control over such property had to be exercised in conformity with
the purpose of the dedication.
The Supreme Court of Illinois, in City of Jacksonville v. Jacksonville
Ry.,108 had to pass upon the validity of a special act of the Legislature
empowering the railway company to construct and operate its railway
" 'in, over, across and along any and all the avenues, streets, public
grounds, squares and alleys' "109 of Jacksonville, as applied to the appro-
priation by the railway of land dedicated as a public square. Justice
Thornton stated:
In this case the attempted use of the public square by the railway company
for the track of its road, is a manifest perversion of the trust created and de-
clared; would operate injuriously to the public and the abutting lot owners;
would mar the beauty of the ground, destroy it as a place of public recrea-
tion, and cannot be justified. 110
The attempted appropriation was held void and the railroad company
was perpetually enjoined from all attempts to acquire the dedicated land.
THE GRANT PARK CASES
The doctrine evolved from the above three cases was extended to in-
clude the power of eminent domain in the four so-called Grant Park
Cases. The South Park Commissioners of Chicago had lost the first three
cases involving the question of their power, under authorization of the
Legislature, to erect buildings in Grant Park, which was land dedicated
to park purposes. The Illinois Supreme Court held that any attempt by
107 63 Minn. 330,68 N.W. 458 (1896).
108 67 Ill. 540 (1873).
109 Id. at 542.
110 Id. at 545.
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the Legislature to authorize the erection of buildings in Grant Park con-
trary to the terms of the dedication was void.'11
In South Park Comm'rs v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 11 2 the last of the
Grant Park Cases, the Legislature had passed an act which authorized the
erection of a library and a museum in the park, and gave the commis-
sioners the power to condemn any easement, interest, or property right
requiring the park to remain open or vacant. The abutting property
owners, who claimed an easement of view, light, and air, brought suit
to enjoin the threatened construction. The court, in a four-to-three de-
cision, stated:
If the Legislature had no power to change the uses of Grant Park, and to
disregard the terms of the dedications by authorizing the erection and main-
tenance of buildings in the park, there could be no condemnation of the rights
of the defendant that the park should be kept free from buildings, whatever
the nature of such rights might be.113
If the Legislature had no right to erect the buildings, which are now alleged
to be a public use, they could not provide for taking the right of any person
or appropriating his property for such use. To say that having acquired the
right to ascertain and pay the damage to the property of Ward gives the
right to change the use and violate the restriction which did not before exist
would be reasoning backward. A superstructure does not support the founda-
tion, and a lawful public use lies at the very foundation of the right to appro-
priate property or property rights." 4
The minority opinion concluded that the abutting property owners'
easements, like all private property, are subject to the power of eminent
domain, and although the State may not violate its contract, it may, when
the public necessity requires it, condemn the property rights growing
out of such contract.
Thus, for forty-nine years the law in Illinois was that dedicated land
could neither be diverted nor condemned through the exercise of eminent
domain, if the purported change would substantially impair the bene-
ficial use for which the land was dedicated. 1 5 Undoubtedly, many groups
wished to use park land for civic purposes. The last Ward case" 6 stood
against such encroachments as rigidly as the Praetorian guards in ancient
"'l City of Chicago v. Ward, 169 Il1. 392, 48 N.E. 927 (1897); Bliss v. Ward, 198
Ill. 104, 64 N.E. 705 (1902); Ward v. Field Museum, 241 Il. 496, 89 N.E. 731 (1909).
112 248 111. 299,93 N.E. 910 (1911).
118 id. at 306, 93 N.E. at 913.
114 Id. at 310, 93 N.E. at 914.
115 Michigan Blvd. Bldg. Co. v. Chicago Park Dist., 412 Ill. 350, 106 N.E.2d 359
(1952); Cf. City of Aurora ex rel. Egan v. Y.M.C.A., 9 Ill.2d 286, 137 N.E.2d 347 (1956).
(1956).
116 South Park Comm'rs v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 248 111. 299,93 N.E. 910 (1911).
COMMENTS
Rome, but would have fallen because of the 1961 Illinois Supreme Court
"case" of "People v. Chicago Park Dist.,"'' 1 if the controversy had not
become moot prior to the ruling on the petition for rehearing. In that
controversy, the right of the Chicago Park District to convey certain
land in Garfield Park to the University of Illinois for use as the permanent
site of a Chicago campus of the University, was challenged. The plain-
tiffs argued that Garfield Park was dedicated land and that under the
Grant Park Cases this land could neither be diverted nor condemned. The
defendants maintained that such land was not dedicated land, that the
Park District held the land in fee, and that a special act of the Legisla-
ture118 allowed the sale of such land. The court, in rendering the deci-
sion, which was later "withdrawn," held that the land was dedicated, and
not held in fee by the Park District. No ruling was given on the En-
abling Act of 1959, whose constitutionality was questioned as local or
special legislation. The court instead allowed the condemnation under a
statute that was not relied upon by either side. This statute provided that
any municipality may transfer its right, title, and interest in any real
estate to the State of Illinois. 119 Furthermore, it provided that any re-
striction on the land may be removed by condemnation. In the definition
of restriction, the words "dedication" or "lands held in a public trust"
are not included. 120 It was observed earlier in this discussion that the
courts are reluctant to allow condemnation unless the Legislature in ex-
press terms, or by necessary implication, authorizes the same. Therefore,
it may be reasonably concluded that Chief Justice Schaefer, who wrote
the withdrawn opinion, took an extremely liberal view in interpreting
the statute as giving the power to condemn such lands.
CONCLUSION
The future of dedicated lands in Illinois can be reasonably ascertained
from a careful study of the cases mentioned in this article, the withdrawn
opinion, and the dissent in South Park Comm'rs v. Montgomery Ward &
Co., 1 21 if the present Illinois Supreme Court either maintains the same
personnel or at least adheres to a similar line of reasoning. With proper
legislative authority, the Illinois Supreme Court apparently will allow con-
demnation of dedicated lands. The dissent from the last Ward case,
quoted with approval in the withdrawn opinion stated:
117 Nos. 36171 & 36172, Sup. Ct. Ill., Jan. 17, 1961.
118 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 144, S§ 70.1-.4 (1959).
119 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 30, S 158a (1959).
120 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 30, § 156d (1959).
121248 111.299,93 N.E. 910 (1911).
